



Architectural and structural fundamentals for the high-risk buildings : Smart architectural model for safe security surveillance point in Sinai

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Article

Ahmed M. Selim¹ and Azza G. Haggag²

Department of Architecture, Modern Academy for Engineering and Technology, Cairo, Egypt

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Corresponding Author:

Ahmed M. Selim, Department of Architecture, Modern Academy for Engineering and Technology, Cairo, Egypt, **Tel:** +201028282427
Email: ahmed.selim@eng.modern-academy.edu.eg

Abstract

The Increase in explosive bombs and terrorist attacks in the last decade whether in the military or non-military building has shown that the impact of it should be taken in the design process. Egypt was one of the countries targeted by terrorism, especially in Sinai, and that resulted in a huge loss, whether in civilians or in the members of the armed forces. In response to this challenge, this study sheds light on the architectural and structural considerations and roles that could mitigate the potential terrorist threat in buildings, especially the military buildings, as well, determine the most important considerations and roles that affect in designing safe fixed security points through an electronic questionnaire examined by multidisciplinary stakeholders (25 experts) involved in making a key decision in this subject, then, according to "design-based on evidence" a reliable smart architectural model for a safe security surveillance point was suggested for defending and encountering the negative impact of the terrorist attack in Sinai.

I. INTRODUCTION

In fact, the world confronts the specter of terrorism everyday which leads to tremendous destruction of assets and humans caused by an explosive bomb and terrorist attacks whether on military or non-military buildings. In this regard, all previous explosive events and terrorist attack have proven difficult to predict the extent, the severity of damage and injuries, and the best way to reduce these impacts which most of the base studies and governing rules adopted and based on to reduce the effects of explosive events to observe and analyze these past events. It has all proven that it is possible to mitigate damage and injuries by applying some architectural considerations based on the site itself, the building design, and the structure system^[1].

In the last decade, Egypt was one of the countries targeted by terrorism, especially in Sinai, and that resulted in a huge loss, whether in civilians or members of the armed forces. This study suggests a thoughtful design for the fixed security points to mitigate the potential terrorist attack in it, thus, protect the army forces in Sinai.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

II.1. Explosion Definition and Blast Effects

The explosion is an energy in form of light, sound, heat, and shockwave. Indeed, shockwave is considered the main reason for the potential damages to the building because

it consists of highly compressed air transfer from the source in hemispherical propagation shape at supersonic velocities (the positive phase), and when it encounters a surface, the wave is reflected resulting in a tremendous amplification of pressure (negative phase). The reflected wave leads to partial vacuum causes two phenomena^[2]: (a) airburst creating powerful wind (drag pressure) in all the building surface, (b) portion of the energy is imparted to the ground.

II.2. Architecture Design Considerations

Architectural design considerations are significant to mitigate the effects of the explosion, raising the building's efficiency, delaying terrorist attacks, and saving lives and assets. Therefore, implementing it early in the building design phase can reduce the potential risks whether in assets, occupants, and in the cost of maintenance in case of the explosion. For a balanced design, both physical security measures - of which the architectural design is a part - and operational measures must be implemented in facilities. In fact, Architectural design considerations include two pillars, first, site considerations, and second, building considerations^[3].

II.2.1. Site and Layout Design Considerations

It is important to determine the type of threat and required protection level while the designer locates the site and sets

the layout design considerations to create the controlled access zones, therefore, providing an exclusive zone and stand-off distance surrounding the building^[4]. In

this regard, the considerations and roles associated with site and layout design include the following as illustrated in (Table1).

Table 1: Site and layout design considerations

N	Design considerations	The most effective role
1	Site location with ratio to roads,	Perpendicular roads to site location are forbidden
2	visual obstructions and other land uses	Line of sight must be clear (building must be higher)
3	Traffic flow around site layout	Create overlay zone to address area specific roles
4	control access zones	Provide Exclusive zone is critical
5	roadways inside site layout	Serpentine roadways are mandatory
6	Obstacles between fence and building are required	Stands of trees, and earthen berms around the asset
7	Land level in relation to the surrounding land's terrain	Land level must be higher than the surrounding land uses
8	Buildings height and function that surround site layout	Provide performance-based zoning
9	Offsite parking	One way pass, min (25 M) as a Stand-off distance
10	Fence height and shape	Triple-standard concertina wire is appreciated, (7 feet height)
11	Stand-off distance between building and fence	Clear distance (20 to 50 feet)
12	Stand-off distance between fences and roads	Clear distance (20 feet)
13	The site entry gates	Provide Pull-over lanes and inspection areas
14	Entrance vesicle passive barriers location	Center to center spacing should be between (3 and 5 feet)
15	Main gate and entry control points location	Design access points at an angle to oncoming streets

Source: Author based on^[5, 6, 7, 8]

II.2.2. Building Design Considerations

Indeed, the architecture design for the facility plays a vital role to mitigate the effect of the terrorist attack, architectural considerations can be studied from four

aspects: building shape, functions, indoor finishing, and facades finishing^[9]. In this vein, the considerations and their roles associated with building design include the following as illustrated in (Table 2).

Table 2: Building Design Considerations

N	Building design considerations	The most effective role
	Building shape (profile) considerations	
1	The basic shape of the building	The cylindrical and conic shape is preferred
2	The shape of the outer walls	Curved surfaces can be used, convex shapes are preferred
3	The shape of outer building edges	Gradual re-entrant corners have less effect without overhangs
4	Building orientation	Horizontally rather than vertically
5	Building orientation ratio to roads	the primary façade must be shorter than others
	Building functions considerations	
6	The building main function, zones, and inner spaces design	Critical functions must be far from public and services
7	Number of building entrances	Minimize vehicles access points
8	Lobby location	Critical functions must not be placed adjacent to the lobby
9	Location of critical function areas	Must be in the keep-out zone
10	Entrance placement location in relation to the ground floor	In the front and far from critical functions
11	Bomb shelter area and location	Must be accommodated the building users
12	Electromechanical equipment's location	Must be far from the critical function



13	The occupant load for each function space	High occupant load must be in higher floors (back zones)
14	The means of egress for evacuation and safe havens	Minimum 2 egress in two opposite directions
	Indoor finishing considerations	
15	Finishing materials	Fire-resistant materials are necessary
16	Type of internal doors and partitions	Glass doors and partitions are forbidden
17	Type of suspension for ceiling and lighting fixtures	Flexible suspension is mandatory
18	Mounted items and non-structural elements fixation	Perfect fixation for non-structure items is critical
19	Furniture locations ratio to the external walls	Furniture near the external wall is forbidden
	Facades finishing (envelope) considerations	
20	Doors&windows frame and glass type	Using steel doors or steel-clad doors with steel frames
21	Percentage of windows in the lower floors	Not more than (15%) with min sill height (5 feet)
22	Exterior walls finishing material	Sacrificial exterior wall panels to absorb blast
23	Façade's cladding and decoration	Minimal ornamentation is recommended
24	Glazing orientation	Perpendicular to the primary façade

Source: Author based on^[10, 11, 12, 13]

II.3. Structure Design Considerations

Structure system for the high-risk buildings should be designed based on reducing the potential progressive collapse as a result of the explosive bomb or the terrorists

attack, the priority should be given to the critical elements as (slabs, walls, and columns) to mitigate the extent of collapse^[14]. The considerations and roles associated with structure design are illustrated in (Table 3).

Table 3: Structure Design Considerations

N	Design considerations	The most effective role
1	Structure design	Must resist blast load
2	Structure material	Use ductile elements is preferred
3	Primary structure material	Precast reinforced concrete is recommended
4	Slab design	The two-way reinforced slab is recommended
5	Column's design	Columns spacing should be minimized
6	Walls's design	Shear walls are recommended in the vulnerability facade

Source: Author based on^[15, 16, 17, 18]

II.4. Tactical Architecture and Structure Design principles

Architectural and structural design must be provided with a general profile that describes the potential threat as well as, the type of weapons and techniques that can be used by aggressors, to design a safe, economic, and suitable structure system and finishing materials for the facility that can resist this threat. Consequently, and where this study suggests a design for a safe security surveillance point in Sinai, the previous events for the terrorist attacks can identify the type of used weapons at these attacks as Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPG), Mortar Grenades, and Guns. In this respect, the tactical architecture and structure

design considerations required to resist direct fire caused by these weapons as follow^[19]:

- Locate the building on a high point (on a hill) to strike at an oblique angle, which will reduce the effectiveness of the projectile.
- Block the line of sights toward the potential target.
- Provide fences with a minimum (10 m) away from the building and (1.8m to 2.4) height.
- Use pre-detonation screen, standoff distance range between (2 to 15 m).
- Use concrete walls and roofs covered by sandbags and steel plates from outside those increases the stiffness of the wall as illustrated in Figure (1) and Figure (2)^[20].




Fig. 1: Anti-tank weapon wall retrofit using sand




Fig. 2: Anti-tank weapon wall retrofit using sand and spall plate

III. METHODOLOGY

The study was based on four pillars:

III.1. The first pillar (literature review): (Forty-Five design considerations) as: Basic site, layout, building, and structure design considerations were identified from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) manuals, academia, and the published articles in this topic using the inductive method.

III.2. The second pillar (baseline survey): An

electronic questionnaire was conducted to determine the most important type of considerations (site, building, and structure), then, the most important considerations that affect in designing safe fixed security points in Sinai to mitigate the threat of terrorists and reduce the effect of potential risks. Multidisciplinary stakeholders (25 experts) involved in making a key decision in this issue was selected, then 25 electronic questionnaires were distributed as illustrated in (Table 4).

Table 4: The distribution of the electronic questionnaire to the experts

Participants	Number
Ministry of defense	5
Civil defense	5
PhD. Architects	10
PhD. Structure engineers	5
Total	25

III. 3. The third pillar (statistical analysis): Subsequently, the result of the electronic questionnaire was implicated. Statistical analysis was calculated, starting from calculating the mean value (μ), Standard Deviation (α), and the Coefficient of Variance (CV) to measure the homogeneity of the sample, then, concluding the relative importance index (RII) by using (Likert) classification (k)

$$(\mu) = \frac{n_1 + 2n_2 + 3n_3 + 4n_4 + 5n_5}{\text{Total number of samples}}$$

$$(CV) = \left(\frac{\alpha}{\mu} \right) * 100$$

As regards the (CV) result, the average was 12.92 (between 10-20), which means that sample was homogeneous and balanced where:

- CV < 10 = Excellent sample

as (EI) = (Extremely important - (I) = important - (A) = Average - (NI) = Not important - (ENI) = Extremely not important, finally, the study set the importance level and relative ranking for each design consideration and role ratio to each phase, as well the global ranking ratio to (45) considerations by using the following equations^[21]:

- CV (between 10-20) = Very good
- CV (between 20-30) = Acceptable
- CV (between 30-40) = Low
- CV > 40 = Unacceptable

$$(RII) = \frac{n_1 + 2n_2 + 3n_3 + 4n_4 + 5n_5}{5(n_1 + n_2 + n_3 + n_4 + n_5)}^{[22]}$$

- RII = 0: 0.20 = Importance level (Low = L)
- RII = 0.21: 0.40 = Importance level (Medium low = M-L)
- RII = 0.41: 0.60 = Importance level (Medium = M)
- RII = 0.61: 0.80 = Importance level (Medium high = M-H)
- RII = 0.81: 1.00 = Importance level (High = H)

Where (n5) the number of experts scored (EI), (n4) the number of experts scored (I), (n3) the number of experts scored (A), (n2) the number of experts scored (NI), and (n1) the number of experts scored (ENI).

III.4. The fourth pillar (suggesting safe security surveillance point): according to "design-based on evidence" concept [23]. An architectural and structural model for a safe security surveillance point was suggested for defending and encountering the negative impact of the terrorist attack in Sinai, based on the most important considerations that concluded from the result of the electronic questionnaire, the type of the threat, and the literature reviews.

IV. RESULTS

The results of the study were divided into two sections. The first is related to the electronic questionnaire throughout

the experts overall evaluation for the design considerations as illustrated in Figure (3), and the second section is related to the suggested design as illustrated below.

First, from the statistical analysis of the Electronic Questionnaire, and after verification of the questionnaire through (CV) coefficient as shown in (Table 5 and 6), the most important phase was Site and Layout Design Considerations, and the most important consideration (the highest global weight) was (Traffic flow around site layout), that reflects, as well as, (twenty-one) considerations were ranked (high), and (twenty-four) considerations were ranked (high-medium). More specifically, the analysis result determined the most important considerations which ranked (high) from (1) to (10) ratio to the global rank according to multidisciplinary stakeholders (25 experts) evaluation as:

- (Five) considerations were from the site and layout design where, traffic flow around site layout was ranked (1), control access zones and the site entry gates were ranked (2), buildings height and function that surround site layout was ranked (4), and site location with ratio to roads ranked (8).
- (Four) considerations were from building design where, finishing materials were ranked (5), the building main

function, zones and inner spaces design was ranked (7), bomb shelter area and location was ranked (9), and doors and windows frame and glass type was ranked (10).

• (Two) considerations were from structure design where, structure design was ranked (3), the building main function, walls design was ranked (6).

Table 5: The statistical analysis of the design phases result

							Mean	Standard Deviation	Coefficient of Variance	Relative Important Index	Importance level	Relative ranking
Code/N	EI	I	A	NI	ENI	μ	α	cv	RII			
Design Phases	II.2.1	16	8	1	0	0	4.600	0.365	7.938	0.920	High	1
	II.2.2	9	14	2	0	0	4.280	0.388	9.069	0.856	High	3
	II.3	15	6	2	2	0	4.360	0.602	13.812	0.872	High	2

Table 6: The statistical analysis of the Electronic Questionnaire result

	Code/N	EI	I	A	NI	ENI	Mean	Standard Deviation	Coefficient of Variance	Relative Important Index	Importance level	Relative ranking	Global rank
							μ	α	cv	RII			
Site and Layout Design Considerations	1	8	15	1	1	0	4.200	0.447	10.648	0.840	High	4	8
	2	10	8	6	1	0	4.080	0.575	14.094	0.816	High	5	11
	3	20	3	0	2	0	4.640	0.544	11.725	0.928	High	1	1
	4	16	8	0	1	0	4.560	0.450	9.872	0.912	High	2	2
	5	5	8	10	2	0	3.640	0.574	15.766	0.728	Medium High	9	24
	6	5	12	6	1	1	3.760	0.613	16.308	0.752	Medium High	8	20
	7	3	13	6	3	0	3.640	0.544	14.947	0.728	Medium High	9	24
	8	14	9	1	1	0	4.440	0.486	10.941	0.888	High	3	4
	9	5	8	10	2	0	3.640	0.574	15.766	0.728	Medium High	9	24
	10	2	14	7	2	0	3.640	0.479	13.156	0.728	Medium High	9	24
	11	7	12	6	0	0	4.040	0.465	11.504	0.808	High	6	13
	12	6	13	6	0	0	4.000	0.447	11.180	0.800	Medium High	7	15
	13	16	8	0	1	0	4.560	0.450	9.872	0.912	High	2	2
	14	5	15	5	0	0	4.000	0.408	10.206	0.800	Medium High	7	15
	15	2	13	9	0	1	3.600	0.516	14.344	0.720	Medium High	10	27
	1	3	9	10	3	0	3.480	0.551	15.844	0.696	Medium High	20	35
	2	5	8	11	1	0	3.680	0.539	14.650	0.736	Medium High	17	31
	3	5	13	7	0	0	3.920	0.444	11.332	0.784	Medium High	12	23



Building Design Considerations	4	10	10	5	0	0	4.200	0.483	11.501	0.840	High	9	18
	5	8	13	3	1	0	4.120	0.494	11.989	0.824	High	11	20
	6	15	8	2	0	0	4.520	0.413	9.140	0.904	High	2	7
	7	6	10	8	1	0	3.840	0.538	14.008	0.768	Medium High	14	28
	8	9	14	2	0	0	4.280	0.388	9.069	0.856	High	7	16
	9	9	13	3	0	0	4.240	0.420	9.894	0.848	High	8	17
	10	11	10	4	0	0	4.280	0.466	10.892	0.856	High	7	16
	11	12	12	1	0	0	4.440	0.369	8.306	0.888	High	3	9
	12	8	14	2	1	0	4.160	0.472	11.343	0.832	High	10	19
	13	5	6	8	6	0	3.400	0.683	20.092	0.680	Medium High	21	36
	14	13	9	2	1	0	4.360	0.513	11.755	0.872	High	5	12
	15	18	5	2	0	0	4.640	0.403	8.692	0.928	High	1	5
	16	6	11	7	1	0	3.880	0.527	13.573	0.776	Medium High	13	25
	17	1	6	16	2	0	3.240	0.420	12.948	0.648	Medium High	22	37
	18	5	8	10	2	0	3.640	0.574	15.766	0.728	Medium High	18	33
	19	5	7	9	1	3	3.400	0.775	22.782	0.680	Medium High	21	36
	20	13	9	3	0	0	4.400	0.447	10.164	0.880	High	4	10
	21	4	13	6	2	0	3.760	0.525	13.972	0.752	Medium High	15	29
	22	13	8	3	1	0	4.320	0.539	12.480	0.864	High	6	14
	23	7	7	8	3	0	3.720	0.646	17.366	0.744	Medium High	16	30
	24	4	9	9	3	0	3.560	0.580	16.282	0.712	Medium High	19	34
Structure Considerations	1	21	3	0	1	0	4.760	0.420	8.814	0.952	High	1	3
	2	7	12	4	2	0	3.960	0.562	14.195	0.792	Medium High	3	21
	3	6	11	5	3	0	3.800	0.606	15.935	0.760	Medium High	5	26
	4	4	10	8	3	0	3.600	0.577	16.038	0.720	Medium High	6	32
	5	6	11	7	1	0	3.880	0.527	13.573	0.776	Medium High	4	22
	6	16	7	1	1	0	4.520	0.487	10.778	0.904	High	2	6
The average of (Coefficient of Variance)									12.92				

Where (EI) = Extremely important- (I) = important- (A) = Average- (NI) = Not important - (ENI) = Extremely not important




Fig. 3: Experts overall evaluation for the design considerations

Second, based on, literature review, the most important considerations that conducted from the electronic questionnaire, tactical engineering principles and structure design discussed as in Figure (1) and (2). A proposed model has been designed for a safe security surveillance point in Sinai as shown in Figures (4) and (5). Concerning the design of the proposed model unit, it consists of:

- Five precast reinforced pipes with radius (1.2 m). The own weight for each one including the furniture (5.8 ton), four of them for soldiers, each pipe accommodates four soldiers, supported with (four) beds, toilet, shower cabin, and (four) lockers.
- Each pipe contains (five) firing slots with (30 cm width, 40 cm height) distributed to cover the line of

sight, these slots can be closed by sliding steel plates with a thickness (8mm), as well as, (one) sliding steel door with (70 cm width, 180 cm height) consists of two layers of steel plates with a thickness (6mm for each) and (28.4 mm bullet fiberglass) between them.

- The flooring for the pipes is from grating steel plates with a thickness (6mm), all the pipes painted from inside by (anti-bacterial and fire-resistant painting), all the furniture units were made from stainless steel and galvanized plates with curved edges, and all the outer perimeter of the pipes protected by sandbags with a thickness (40cm) stacked staggered.

- The last pipe is for the battalion commander and the weapons and ammunition store, also it has the same


finishing specifications for the four pipes.

The five pipes were assembled as illustrated in Figure (4). The roof of the unit consists of three layers: grating plates with a thickness (8mm), checkered plates with a thickness (2mm), and sandbags with height (20 cm), the access for the roof by external ladder, also the roof corners supported with shooting units protected by sandbags.


On another hand, a set of design considerations were

taken in the site layout to provide high protection for the model as illustrated in Figure (5) and (6) and through the following:


- Locate the model above a hill with height (1.5 m).
- The unit has two emergency exits in two opposite directions, as well as, the pass for escape was protected by pipes filled with sand with (height 1.2 m).
- Provide four pre-detonation screens with standoff distance (15 m).
- The site perimeter for the unit is protected with a triple standard concertina fence with a clear zone (20m) surrounding.



(a) The masterplan of the proposed model and its components




(b) Perspective section passing through the battalion commander's unit




(c) Perspective section passing through one of soldiers' unit

Fig. 4: The model design for safe security surveillance point in Sinai



- (1) Triple standard concertina fence around site parameters.
- (2) Pre-detonation screens around site sides.
- (3) Sandbags around firing slots.
- (4) Extra sandbag corners supported shooting points.

Fig. 5: Perspective shot for the layout for safe security surveillance point in Sinai



(a) The structure system for the proposed model




Fig. 6: The Architectural masterplan of the surveillance point, and the structure system model.

V. DISCUSSION

With regard to the evaluation of the electronic questionnaire, (five) roles related to the site and layout design must be applied as: roles create overlay zone to address area-specific, providing exclusive zone is critical, providing performance-based zoning, providing pull-over lanes and inspection areas, and perpendicular roads to site location are forbidden, that reflects the consensus of

experts that implementing precautionary procedures during the layout design process plays a vital role in preventing the explosion, or in other words mitigate the impact of the explosion and therefore reducing losses whether in assets or humans to a minimum by moving the potential hazard away from the building.

Similarly, (four) roles related to building design must be applied as: fire resistant materials are necessary,

critical functions must be far from public and services, bomb shelter must accommodate the building users, and using steel doors or steel-clad doors with steel frames. The experts' choices for these considerations and rules ensured that experts' concern not only on the assets but also on the souls of the building's users, which the experts considered to be of first priority according to the result of the evaluation. For example, the experts' choice of providing a bomb shelter location with an area that can accommodate the occupant load of the building users reflects the experts' keenness on the building's users before the building itself.

As well as, (two) roles related to structure design must be applied as: Structure design must resist blast load, and using Shear walls are recommended in the vulnerability façade, that reflect the importance of using these criteria in the structure design process to reduce the potential progressive collapse as a result of the explosive bomb or the terrorist's attack.

In the light of the proposed model, the precast reinforced pipes with radius (1.2m) can provide high protection for the army forces, and the ability to be rearranged in many shapes according to the site circumstances, more specifically, each site, building and structure considerations were applied related the experts' evaluation for the electronic questionnaire which determines the considerations with priority. Therefore, the advantages of the suggested model can be summarized as:

- It considered a mobile unit where the location can be changed in a short time.
- Easy, fast, and low-cost maintenance and renewal in case of damage as a result of any attack.
- Availability to rearrange the units according to the site circumstances.
- The initial cost for this model is lower than the traditional model.
- The ability for modification to provide more protection in case of war.
- Site mobilization and collecting the units don't need skilled laborers.
- It can be used as an emergency shelter in case of disasters.
- Opportunity for an extension by adding more than one model according to army force needs.
- Wall and roof layers provide high protection against (RPG) and mortar projectiles according to the standards.
- Locating the model on a hill, and the pre-detonation screens can provide protection against direct shots.

In addition, alternative materials and technologies can be used to enhance the performance of the model for instance:

- Use ultra-high performance fiber reinforced concrete (UHPFRC) which provide advanced mechanical properties and lighter weight compared with the (PRC)[24].
- Install bulletproof windows supported with glass or fiberglass instead of the galvanized steel plates.
- Promote the site with solar cells to provide electricity in case of emergency.

- Provide a camera system supported with infra-red to monitor the site.

Despite, using these materials and technologies will improve the model performance but it will increase the cost of implementation and maintenance in case of terrorist attacks, therefore, risk assessment for the potential threat is too important to identify the best treatments whether in choosing the materials and technologies or the arrangement of the pipes.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

Identifying the architectural, structural, and tactical considerations and roles for high-risk buildings play a vital role in mitigating the hazard of terrorist assaults. It can prevent these events in some scenarios. Traffic flow around site layout, control access zones, the site entry gates location ratio to the building, and structure design must resist blast load, using shear walls to reduce the potential progressive collapse as a result of the explosive bomb or the terrorist attack are considered the most important considerations in design these types of buildings as a result of the multidisciplinary experts' evaluation. In this respect, implementing the design considerations according to its ranks whether relative or global rank which concluded from the electronic questionnaire could enhance the building performance, reduce the cost, save time, and mitigate the impact of potential attacks.

In the relevant context, the suggested smart model for safe security surveillance point in Sinai which is based on the precast reinforced concrete pipes with radius (1.2 m) as a design unit can achieve many advantages either in war or in peace. It has an easy, fast, and low-cost maintenance. In addition to its availability to rearrange the units according to the site circumstances. Also, the suggested model can be used in peace as a camp unit for labors in the petroleum fields in the high-risk areas.

Finally, the suggested model is a conceptual model that was designed according to the previous events for the terrorist attacks, therefore, the type of weapons that used in these attacks only (traditional RPG and mortar). So, field experiments could be applied to explore the model's weakness points to improve its performance.

VII. ACKNOWLEDGMENT

We gratefully thank Prof. Magdy Tammam, and Dr. Omar Ismail for their technical support.


VIII. REFERENCES


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
IX.. APPENDICES

This section includes a google form (the electronic questionnaire) as a pdf file, it contains all the questions and the results as numbers and bars.







9-Offsite parking: One way pass, min (25 M) as a Stand-off distance
مواقف السيارات خارج الموقع العام : تكون عبارة عن مسار من اتجاه واحد على بعد 25 م من السور كحرم خارجي محيط
25 responses




10- Fence height and shape: Triple-standard concertina wire is appreciated, (7 feet height)
ارتفاع وشكل السور : استخدام سياج معنلي ثلاثي من أسلاك الكونسرثينا بارتفاع لا يقل عن 7 أقدام
25 responses




11- Stand-off distance between building and fence : Clear distance (20 to 50 feet)
المسافة الفاصلة بين المبنى و السور : حرم يتراوح ما بين 20 - 50 قدم
25 responses




12- Stand-off distance between fences and roads : Clear distance (20 feet)
المسافة الفاصلة بين السور والطرق المحيطة : حرم في حدود 20 قدم
25 responses




13-The site entry gates : Provide Pull-over lanes and inspection areas
دخول الموقع : توفير مناطق تقشيش عند الدخول و خط سير لاستبعاد المخلاء
25 responses



14- Entrance vehicle passive barriers location : Center to center spacing should be between (3 and 5 feet)
أماكن حواجز دخول السيارات الغير تقاطعية : على مسافات من المنتصف إلى المنتصف تتراوح من 3-5 أقدام
25 responses




15- Main gate and entry control points location : Design access points at an angle to oncoming streets
بوابات الدخول الرئيسية ونقاط الدخول المؤمنة : يجب تصميمها بحيث تكون مائلة على اتجاه الشارع الخارجي
25 responses





Second: Building Design Considerations: (a) Building shape (profile) considerations

16-The basic shape of the building: Cylindrical and conic shapes are preferred.
الشكل البدائي الأساسي : يفضل استخدام الأشكال الاسطوانية أو المخروطية.
25 responses




17-Shape of outer walls: Curved surfaces can be used, convex shapes are preferred.
شكل الحوائط الخارجية : يمكن استخدام الحوائط المنحنية ويفضل المنحنية
25 responses







Second: Building Design Considerations: (b) Building functions considerations









Second: Building Design Considerations: (c) Indoor finishing considerations



Second: Building Design Considerations: (d) Facades finishing (envelope) considerations





Third: Structure Design Considerations

